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Car Trouble: Some Help for the Uninformed Buyer
DAvID A. WARREN*
Vehicle purchasers have been in need of help for quite some time now. This Note
discusses reasons for this observation, by examining the legal framework that
allocates a significant and disproportionate amount of bargaining power to the
seller in the typical transaction. Possible sources of this disparity are problems
relating to consumer literacy and racial discrimination, issues that are discussed
in detail. These problems are considered in the context of warranty disclaimers
and the sale of used cars, an area of the law that is particularly hospitable to
advancing the interests of car dealers. The federal and state laws pertaining to
this area are ineffective at relieving consumer distress.
This Note advocates taking an approach that would give consumers more
information before signing the sales agreement, increasing their bargaining
power and therefore allowing them to escape a potentially problematic situation
by asking more questions and bargaining with the seller for more favorable
terms. This is in stark contrast to much of the recently passed, popular legislation
that has focused on providing a remedy for the car purchaser only after a
problem has already been created Changing the Uniform Commercial Code
and encouraging states to adopt the amendments would be a significant step in
the course of protecting consumers who have historically faced serious "car
trouble."
I. INTRODUCTION
Mike Dowdall could have used some help when he was shopping for a truck
in the spring of 1999.' He thought that the local used car dealership was a
reputable business and that he could get a suitable truck for work there at a
reasonable price.2 A friendly dealer directed Mr. Dowdall to a white Ford pick-up
truck that seemed to be in good shape with a relatively low number of miles on
the odometer.3 Dowdall was told that the vehicle was a trade-in from one of the
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1 Mr. Dowdall's story was a feature in The Pitch, a newspaper in Kansas City, Missouri.
Allie Johnson, Hell on Wheels: Wrecked and Abused Rental Cars Get a New Lease on Life at
Shawnee Mission Ford, KAN. CiTY PITCH WKLY., Sept. 5, 2002, at 1, available at
http://www.pitch.com/issues/2002-09-05/news/feature.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2005).
2 1d.
3 Id. A pick-up truck was the natural choice for Mr. Dowdall because he was shopping for
a vehicle that could transport both people and materials to and from work. Id.
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dealership's frequent customers.4 This, in fact, was not the case. The truck was
actually purchased from the residential driveway of an ex-convict who sold
vehicles that were previously used as rentals for Enterprise Rent-A-Car®.5 The
truck had been wrecked in the past and required serious repair work because of all
of the defects. 6 Dowdall was subsequently contacted by the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, and was informed that the odometer had been
"rolled back" on his truck.7 The truck was also returned to the dealer after the
previous purchaser, Don Wagner, discovered that there were serious mechanical
defects and demanded a refund.8 But this did not prevent the dealership from
selling it soon after it had been returned-without disclosing any of the defects
that justified the recent refund.
Dowdall's case is an extreme example of how consumers get cheated by car
dealers who take advantage of buyers. The ex-con from whom the dealership was
buying had recently sold vehicles to twelve major car dealers and five smaller
dealers with locations in Kansas and Missouri.9 The law firm that Dowdall
contacted had won similar lawsuits against the same dealership ten years before
Dowdall contacted them.10 Although an attorney for this firm claims that he can
recognize previous damage and signs of odometer rollback," l the used car
manager and the saleswoman of the car dealership who dealt with Dowdall both
claimed that they were not able to make the same identification from their limited
training. 12 This example of a typical consumer's problems with a used car
dealership shows that the current legal system in place to protect consumers does
4 1d.
5 Id. Although the dealership could have purchased the cars from the rental car firm itself
for less money, it chose to go through the two-time felon. Id.
6 Id. The amount of money that Dowdall lost as a result of repair and improvement costs
to the truck nearly exceeded the price that he paid to purchase the vehicle. Id. It is likely that
Dowdall would have a cause of action under the Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices
statutes of most states. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
7 Johnson, supra note 1. The actual number of miles that the truck was driven was more
than twice what the odometer displayed. Id. The dealership most likely was violating both
federal and state law by tampering with the odometer on the truck. Federal law prohibits both
tampering with odometers and transferring title to vehicles with odometers that are known to
have been changed. 49 U.S.C. §§ 32703, 32705 (2000). Federal law also does not affect state
laws that prohibit tampering with odometers. 49 U.S.C. § 32711 (2000).
8 Johnson, supra note 1. Wagner was met with resistance when he demanded that the
dealership buy back the defective truck.
9 Id.
10 Id. Despite the fact that the dealership had already paid a substantial award of damages
for this prior suit, it apparently had not significantly changed its business practices.
I Ild.
12 Id. The attorney claims that all dealers are able to identify previously damaged vehicles.
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not prevent the initial harm to buyers and does not cause the dealerships to change
their ways to avoid liability.
In many commercial transactions, consumers are outmatched by the seller in
terms of bargaining power. This disparity is especially significant in the context of
purchasing an automobile and dealing with warranties because the current state of
consumer law does not allow for any remediation. Popular legislation, including
state lemon laws, is aimed at helping consumers recover after the contract has
already been completed. The Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), which has
been adopted by each state in some form, provides consumers with numerous
protections. 13 However, these protections can easily be waived by the buyer if the
seller includes a disclaimer that the buyer unknowingly accepts.' 4 But if states
adopted significant changes in the disclaimer requirements of the UCC,
consumers would acquire a better understanding of the protections that they have
and would be able to bargain on an equal footing with car dealers.
This Note defines specific problems that consumers face when purchasing
automobiles and proposes solutions to those problems. Part II outlines the relative
importance of purchasing automobiles to consumers and the problems that
consumers face with auto dealers who have a bargaining power advantage. Most
consumers do not have the level of literacy necessary to fully understand a car
purchase contract. Spanish-speaking consumers confront problems with English-
language contracts and African-American consumers deal with racial
discrimination from car dealers. Part 11 analyzes the legal relief that is currently
available to consumers under state and federal law. The state of the law regarding
consumer protection today is inadequate to remedy the bargaining power
disadvantage that car buyers face. Part IV undertakes to help out consumers by
requiring the inclusion of better disclosures in purchase contracts. Changing the
UCC disclaimer provisions to make it more difficult for car dealers to void the
implied warranties will increase bargaining and prevent consumers from being
surprised later if they run into costly mechanical problems with their vehicles.
13 The Uniform Commercial Code is a model law for states to adopt as their primary
commercial law. Article 2 of the UCC pertains to sales. The writing and revision of the UCC is
done primarily by the American Law Institute ("ALI") and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL"). These organizations consist of
attorneys, judges, professors, and other scholars from the legal community. Many states have
adopted the UCC as their primary sales law with some minor alterations. Any significant
changes made to the UCC will cause state legislatures to recognize that a change in their
respective versions may be in order.
14 Sellers are able to disclaim warranties by including the phrase "as is" in the contract as
notice to buyers that they are not protected by implied warranties. U.C.C. § 2-316 (1999). See
infra note 80 and accompanying text.
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I. ANALYSIS OF A CAR PURCHASE
Purchasing automobiles is very important to consumers and- to the economy
because vehicles are generally very expensive. The purchase of a car is often
second in importance only to the purchase of a home.15 Despite the importance of
these purchases, there is a significant disparity in the amount of commercial
sophistication that exists between the seasoned car dealer and the unsuspecting
consumer. Because of this disparity in commercial sophistication, consumers
have a bargaining power disadvantage because they cannot use the knowledge of
legal protection as leverage when negotiating.
A. The Importance of Car Purchases
Automobile purchases are very important to both parties to the contract.
Although used cars are generally less expensive than new cars, used vehicle sales
still account for a significant amount of money.16 This Note focuses mainly on
the actions of used car dealers regarding the warranty provisions that they offer
(or deny) buyers. 17 Consumers must understand that they need to do some serious
research before spending a significant amount of money on a vehicle, because car
buying has been considered dangerous by consumer advocates. 18 These
advocates claim that they are on the same side as the buyer by making it seem as
15 A car purchase may be third in importance if a consumer pays for graduate school
because the price of higher education, especially legal and medical school, is much greater than
that of most vehicles. John R. Kramer, Legal Education in an Era of Change: Will Legal
Education Remain Affordable, by Whom, and How?, 1987 DuKE L.J. 240, 247 (1987).
16 Franchised new car dealers sold 19.4 million used cars for an average price of $13,850
each in 2002, making total sales of almost $270 billion. NATIONAL AUTOMOBILE DEALERS
ASSOCIATION ANALYSIS DIvIsION, NADA DATA, THE USED-VEHICLE DEPARTMENT,
http://www.nada.org/Content/NavigationMenu/MediaCenter/NADAData/20033/NADAData_
usedvehicle.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2005). This confirms the writings of some commentators
who predicted increased used car sales due to better made and maintained cars. See Bruce
Mann & Thomas J. Holdych, When Lemons Are Better Than Lemonade: The Case Against
Mandatory Used Car Warranties, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 1, 5 (1996).
17 Vehicle manufacturers may actually afford "secret" or "good-will" warranties to
consumers without their knowledge, giving extra protection to new car buyers. Jeff Sovem,
Good Will Adjustment Games: An Economic and Legal Analysis of Secret Warranty
Regulation, 60 MO. L. REV. 323, 325-26 (1995). Manufacturers will allow dealers to make the
repairs for free if the dealer believes that the consumer is likely to buy again from the
manufacturer. Id. at 334-35. Used cars normally have less warranty protection than new cars.
18 "Auto Purchases and Lease Fraud" is currently on the Top Ten Hot Topics list at
ConsumerVoiceUSA.com. Consumer Voice USA Homepage,
http://www.consumervoiceusa.com/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2005).
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if the dealer and buyer are at odds in a contractual battle. 19 Despite all of the
warnings from these advocates, consumers are probably not as careful as they
should be before they sign a purchase contract for a car.
The average consumer is a profitable target for experienced car dealers for a
variety of reasons.. Despite the fact that there is a wealth of information involving
car-buying strategies on the intemet20 and in print,21 many consumers still face an
informational disadvantage when compared with car dealers. Common
experiences include high-pressure, hurried sales, and complex paperwork that
goes unread.22 The price and other features of the product tend to be the main
points of concern, resulting in consumers not reading warranty information in the
typical case. 23 Common dealer add-ons may include expensive service contracts,
extended warranties, and insurance that is not needed. 24 The most common
responses to the question of how dealers could improve the buying experience for
consumers were for dealers to lessen the amount of pressure in sales and to
increase their levels of honesty, according to a survey of new-car buyers.2 5
19 "Car dealers hate us ... You'll Love us" is the slogan for CarBuyingTips.com.
CarBuyingTips.com Homepage, http://www.carbuyingtips.com/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2005).
20 There are a variety of websites that are useful to consumers by allowing them to
compare prices of new and used cars and learn about common dealer "scams." See, e.g.,
http://www.carbuyingtips.com/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2005); http://www.edmunds.com/ (last
visited Feb. 26,2005).
21 See, e.g., MARK ESKELDSON, WHAT CAR DEALERS DON'T WANT You To KNOw
(1995); Buying Tips: Tricks of the Trade, CONSUMER REPS., Apr. 2003, at 17.
22 Michael J. Phillips, Unconscionability and Article 2 Implied Warranty Disclaimers, 62
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 199, 243 (1985).
23 Id.
24 Two large national auto dealers, AutoNation and Sonic Automotive were brought into
Florida courts to defend class action suits for allegedly inflating the prices on extended
warranties and service contracts. See William R. Levesque, Suit Accuses Auto Dealers of
Trickery on Warranties, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 10, 2002, at 6B. Dealers have also been
accused of making inadequate disclosures on warranties. See Used-Car Dealers Accused of
Fraud, ST. LOuIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 13, 1991, at 4C. "Bait and Switch" tactics are
commonly used to lure customers into a dealership promising good deals on vehicles but then
not having the vehicles available when the customer arrives-leaving the consumer with only
the expensive vehicles for sale. Mark Curriden, Buyers' Suit Says Car Dealer Used Fraud to
Trap Customers, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 11, 1992, at A3.
25 AUTOMOTIVE RETAILING TODAY, SURVEY OF ATITUDES AND PERCEPTIONS OF THE
AUTOMOBIE PURCHASE EXPERIENCE AMONG THREE MAJOR GROUPS 2002 (Jan. 2003)
(researched by Wirthlin Worldwide), http://www.autoretailing.org/pdf/consumer.pdf (last
visited Feb. 26, 2005). Automotive Retailing Today is an organization that seeks to "build
stronger customer relationships" by "promot[ing] a better understanding of the retail side of the
automotive industry." See Automotive Retailing Today, About ART,
http://www.autoretailing.org/about.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2005).
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Many consumers have bad experiences when purchasing a car and then do
not trust car salespeople after those experiences.26 Consumers cannot know the
true nature of a car purchase from negotiations through the final signing unless
they have already gone through the whole experience once and have been
harmed. The consumer's lack of information before making that initial purchase
adds to the bargaining power disadvantage that consumers face when matched
against experienced car dealers.27
B. Bargaining Problems Inherent in a Vehicle Purchase
Professor Stephen Plass outlines a typical transaction involving the purchase
of a used car.28 Plass describes a young woman looking for an inexpensive car for
transportation to work.29 The dealer pressures her into acting quickly and presents
her with complex paperwork that includes expensive options that were never
expressly accepted by her.30 Some of these extras included various types of
insurance and expensive financing despite her good credit rating.31 Because the
26 See, e.g., Christopher A. Sawyer, Losing the Youth Market, AUTOMOTIVE DESIGN &
PRODUcTION, Apr. 1, 2003, at 56. The author expresses surprise at the reaction of a young
woman to American car dealers who have caused her to claim that she will never buy another
domestic car. The woman stated in the article that "[a]ll they cared about was the sale," when
referring to the dealers. Id. Consumers like this woman may be more wary the second time they
purchase a vehicle, but they still deserve protection the first time around, when they are not
likely to be as cautious.
27 Bargaining power disparity has been expressly recognized in other similar
circumstances, including the disadvantage that employees face when dealing with their
employers regarding union membership. "In dealing with such employers, the individual
unorganized worker is helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract." See CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 923 (West 1994).
28 Stephen A. Plass, Bargain Avoidance in a Competitive Bargain Market: The Car Sales
Conundrum, 2 Wyo. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (2002).
29 Id.
30 Id. An example of a typical contract for the sale of an automobile shows that there is a
lot of space for dealer add-ons on the front of the contract and very little space for the disclaimer
of warranties that can be found on the reverse side of the document. E. ALLAN FARNsWORTH &
WILLIAM F. YOUNG, SELECTIONS FOR CONTRACTS 258-59 (2001). Although the dealer's
registration fee looks variable because a maximum is written in the contract, that maximum
amount is already included in the price, so that term probably is not negotiated often. See id.
"Scotch-guarding" the interior of cars formerly was a popular dealer add-on, but a more
common option today is "window-etching," an identifying feature on the vehicle that is
supposedly helpful in case it is stolen. See Bruce Mohl, Lawsuit Takes on Boch Glass-Etching
Fee, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 3, 2002, at E3. In this situation, the price for the etching was
included in the purchase price without the consent of the buyer. Id.
31 Plass, supra note 28, at 10-11. This buyer could probably have obtained better
financing if she would have procured it on her own from another lending institution outside of
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dealer offered her a significant trade-in price for her old vehicle, which she valued
very lowly, she trusted him and signed the rest of the paperwork without asking
any questions.32 She did not even have enough time to read through the lengthy
documents because the dealer was pressuring her so much.33 This may have been
a strategy by the salesman to complete the sale quickly, freeing him to make
another deal with another customer. This is a common scenario that involves very
little actual bargaining. 34 Professor Plass also mentions that many of these
consumers will probably just pay the extra charges and treat it as a "bad
experience. '35 These consumers may not seek legal relief because they do not
know how they are protected by the law and may not even know about the
freedom to bargain over price that is inherent in automobile purchases. 36Sellers have also been alleged to purposely include contract terms that they
know are unenforceable in commercial transactions.37 The cost-benefit analysis
that the seller performs always results in the choice to include the unenforceable
terms because the costs of getting caught are slight and the possible benefits are
substantial.38 This is a result of the imperfect information that leaves the
consumer at the mercy of accepting the terms of the seller. When the seller
includes the unenforceable terms, the consumer is left with the impression that
each term is legally enforceable; the lack of information prohibits the consumer
from knowing the legal environment as well as the seller does. Although a simple
solution to this problem is self-policing by the seller, the general public does not
trust car dealers enough to rely on dealers regulating themselves.39 The general
the car dealership. She may have been under the impression that no sale could be completed
that day if she wanted to finance the purchase through her own bank.
32 Id. She did not believe that her car was worth very much, although this conclusion was
probably not the result of a significant comparison study of the used car valuation guides that
are available to consumers.
3 3 Id.
34 Plass observes that "no bargaining took place at any level on any issue." Id at 11.
35 Id. Consumers also may be unwilling to pursue litigation if they perceive its value to be
low because it is expensive and there is not a high probability of success. Many dealer add-ons
are costly, but not enough to justify the assistance of more costly attorneys.
3 6 1d. at 20.
37 See Bailey Kuklin, On the Knowing Inclusion of Unenforceable Contract and Lease
Terms, 56 U. CiN. L. REV. 845, 845 (1988). Professor Kuklin argues that these types of
transactions are inefficient and need to be regulated through a fashioning of remedies beyond
simple damages. Id. at 861-70.
38 1d at 862.
39 A few car dealers are significantly changing their businesses in response to this
problem. In addition to this, many dealerships are changing their images in hopes of
abandoning the negative stereotype and breeding consumer trust. See Jim Witschger, Our
Customers-Our Partners; Many Companies Provide Thoughtful, Helpful Support Staffs, AM.
SALEsMAN, July 1, 2003, at 8 (describing this phenomenon in the context of arguing that it
should be extended to software sales). But the market demand from consumers is not strong
2005)
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structure and common dealings that occur in a car purchase account for some of
the bargaining problems, although there are other factors that aid the dealer in its
efforts to maximize profits.
C. Other Circumstances that Account for the Bargaining Power Disparity
Many American consumers do not have the general level of literacy that is
required to be able to both read and understand the mass of financial and legal
paperwork that is presented to them at the car dealership. A recent article
examines the results of the U.S. Department of Education National Adult Literacy
Survey ("NALS"), which was completed in 1992 at the insistence of Congress
after the passage of the 1991 National Literacy Act.40 The authors of the article
found that as many as 96% of American adults cannot fully understand credit cost
information presented to them in numerous documents.41 Many of these
documents pertain to highly complex financing information, including interest
rates and down payments that are commonly found in different parts of the mass
of information. 42 This requires consumers to locate and transfer information from
one document to another mentally in order to fully understand what their
obligations are.43 This amount of sophistication is much greater than the general
ability to read and write.44 Because of these difficulties, it is unclear to what
extent consumers are able to assent to the terms of a contract by agreeing to sign
it.45 Dealers, who are much more experienced in using complicated forms and
enough to force all dealers to comply. Furthermore, changing a dealership's image does not
necessarily prevent the dealer from adding unenforceable terms to sales contracts. The practice
of adding illegal terms may not yield to the same market forces that cause image changes
among some dealers.
40 Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REV. 233,235 (2002).
41 Id. at 238. The NALS study was broken up into five different levels of difficulty for the
subjects. Understanding a typical car transaction would fall into the most difficult level (Level
V), and the study found that only around 3% of the subjects had attained this high level of
literacy. Id. at 236-38. One could infer that only this percentage of the subjects in the study
would be able to fully comprehend the terms of the typical vehicle purchase.
4 2 Id. at 237-38.
43 Professors White and Mansfield note that "consumers need a high level of quantitative
literacy in order to understand and evaluate terms of loan transactions." Id. at 240.44 Id.
45 Id. at 250-5 1. White and Mansfield argue that courts do not consider this consumer
defense-they would rather hear arguments relating to unconscionability, fraud, or public
policy exceptions to enforcement. Id. Courts have also found reasonable people not to have the
level of intelligence to understand some other kinds of complicated documents. For example,
employee manuals that are distributed by a firm to explain employment conditions have been
found to be confusing to employees. See Woolley v. Hoffimuann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257,
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calculations, are in a far superior bargaining position as compared to the average
consumer, who does not have a high enough level of literacy to understand the
contract after dealing with it for only a short time.
Although problems involving general American adult literacy are serious, an
equally severe situation is that of Latin consumers in America who cannot speak
or read English entering into commercial transactions with contracts that are
written in English. These Spanish-speaking consumers may be more susceptible
to fraud in their commercial dealings if they are enticed into trusting salespeople
and signing contracts without knowing what they read (assuming that the
contracts are written entirely in English). In 2002, the Hispanic population in the
United States was 37.4 million people, or 13.3% of the American population.46 In
2000, only about half of the total number of Spanish-speakers was reported to
speak English "very well."'47 Consumers need to be fluent in English in order to
understand and bargain over complicated matters involving financing and service
contracts at the dealership.48 Because of the general rule of English-only in
American sales dealings and the lack of regulations that require translation, there
are many cases where Spanish-speaking people have been harmed by car
dealers. 49 These consumers are especially likely to be preyed upon by car dealers
because of their lack of English language education.
Apart from issues about literacy or language, there are also serious problems
of possible racial discrimination against African-American car buyers. An
experiment conducted by Professor Ayres in Chicago had some troubling results
because it showed significant discrimination in car sales to minority consumers.5 0
1266 (N.J. 1985) ("Many of these workers undoubtedly know little about contracts, and many
probably would be unable to analyze the language and terms of the manual.").
46 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU REPORT, THE HISPANIC POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
MARCH 2002, at 1-2 (June 2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p20-
545.pdf (last visited March 2, 2005).
4 7 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU REPORT, LANGUAGE USE AND ENGLISH-SPEAKING ABILITY:
2000, at 2-3 (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-29.pdf (last
visited March 2, 2005).
4 8 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
49 See Steven W. Bender, Consumer Protection for Latinos: Overcoming Language
Fraud and English-Only in the Marketplace, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1027, 1034-36 (1996).
Professor Bender cites numerous examples of Latin consumers experiencing problems relating
to buying cars. Id. One dealer was accused of using Spanish-speaking employees to entice
immigrant customers for their business and another misrepresented the implications of an "as
is" disclaimer. Id.
50 For the results of this upsetting study, see Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race
Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 827-41 (1991). The study
is particularly troubling because car dealers are reported to use sexist and racist language in the
transactions. Id. at 846. see also Mary Flowers Boyce, Discriminating Dealers? Analysis of
Reports That Automobile Dealers Give Better Deals to Whites Than Blacks, AUTo AGE, May
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Black females were found to pay, on average, over three times the mark-up that
white males were forced to pay by the dealers.51 Black men, although they paid
less than black women, were still forced to pay more than twice of what white
men had to pay.52 The study also showed how much more reluctant dealers were
to share information about vehicle costs with minority buyers. While 47% of
white males were given a figure on vehicle costs, only 25% of black males were
given a figure, and not a single black female was given any cost information.53
The price differential that minority buyers faced may have'been a result, in part,
of the decrease in bargaining power that these minority consumers experienced
because of the limited information that the car dealers would offer to them.54 The
most appropriate explanation for the differences in treatment is revenue-based.55
The dealers were able to distinguish between consumers based on their race and
sex to determine which purchasers were more likely to be willing to pay more,
allowing dealers to price discriminate.56 It is imperative to consider the needs of
these minority consumers who are most susceptible to seller abuse when
examining the scope of legal relief that is available in the American marketplace.
1I. LEGAL RELIEF
This Note relates most closely to the problems involving consumers'
knowledge of the UCC and the warranty protection that it provides. There are
also numerous federal and state laws in addition to the UCC that pertain to car
transactions. Courts have also added their gloss to the legal framework by
interpreting the applicable laws in particular situations. Unfortunately, there is
1991, at 12; Deceptive New-Car Ads, Unfair Practices Get Lots of Mileage at Year's End
Fraud, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1993, at BB2.
51 Ayres, supra note 50, at 828. Black females faced a mark-up of $1237, which is more
than three times the amount that white males faced, $362. Id.
52 Id. The average dealer mark-up when dealing with a black male was $783, as opposed
to $362 for a white male. Id.
53 Id. at 836, tbl.5.
54 This proposition is undermined by the fact that the figures represented as the dealer's
cost were inflated substantially. See id at 836.
5 5 Id at 847.
56 Price discrimination is the process of segmenting the population in terms of who is
willing to pay the highest for the goods offered. Because of the variance in the prices of cars for
different people, dealers can pick out the consumers who are willing to pay the most and force
them into paying more than other consumers. Dealers may have determined that black females,
especially, are willing to pay more than white males possibly because of their inability to gain
access to information about the purchase. See id at 848. Professor Ayres also states that "[t]he
process of retail car negotiations becomes even more problematic when traditionally
disadvantaged members of our society effectively pay a bargaining tax whenever they purchase
a new car." Id. at 872.
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some overlap among federal and state laws that can become confusing when read
together in an attempt at harmonization. 57
A. State Consumer Protection Problems
The UCC has been adopted into the laws of each state, but because the UCC
is a model act, states are free to modify the provisions however they see fit. A
recent revision to the UCC has been approved, although it probably will not place
the consumer in a much better bargaining position. 58 The UCC codification is
normally complemented by lemon laws, unfair and deceptive acts and practices
("UDAP") laws, and other miscellaneous provisions.
1. The UCC and its Inherent Problems
The applicable part of the UCC to this Note is Article 2 because it deals with
the sale of goods.59 Many consumers probably do not even know what the UCC
is, or how they are protected by it, for that matter. Even if consumers did know
about the amount of legal protection that is afforded to them, there are several
factors that make the protection illusory.
There is a substantial amount of warranty protection available to consumers
in the UCC. Warranties protect the expectations of buyers in sales transactions by
allocating the risk of product non-conformance (to expectations) between the
parties. 60 Warranties of quality6' come in one of two varieties, express or
57 "One looking for statutory provisions protecting consumers from abuses in consumer
sales transactions might as well use a kaleidoscope as a telescope or a microscope." Donald F.
Clifford, Jr., Non-UCC Statutory Provisions Affecting Warranty Disclaimers and Remedies in
Sales of Goods, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1011, 1016 (1993).
5 8 Although the most recent revisions (the 2003 Amendments) have been approved by the
drafting bodies, the states have not yet incorporated these provisions into their respective
statutory codes. See infra note 103 and accompanying text. The 1999 Amendments are the
latest changes that have been adopted by the states in large part, and that version of the UCC is
cited when referring to the Code as it exists today in many states. Each citation to the most
recently revised UCC is specifically noted as the "amended 2003" version.
59 U.C.C. § 2-102 (1999). Article 2 is divided into numerous specific sections that are
identified as "§ 2-314," for example. This identifies section 314 of Article 2.
60 DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, WARRANTIES AND THE PRACTrrIONER 9 (1981). Changes in
prices occur in commercial transactions according to the risk-shifting that takes place between
parties in the bargaining process. Professor Whaley analogizes warranties to insurance that must
be paid for by consumers. Professor Whaley also describes a brief history of the use of
warranties and dispels notions that caveat emptor, or "buyer beware," ruled ever since the
beginning of civilization. Id. at 5-8.
61 Warranties of quality are different from warranties of title, which are also provided for
in the UCC in § 2-312. Warranties of title bind the seller to the affirmation that there are not
security interests on the goods that are unknown to the consumer and that there is no patent
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implied.62 Express warranties are actually communicated in bargaining for the
contract and result in the creation of expectations to the buyer from the
representations of the seller.63 These warranties must "relate to the goods" and be
a part of the "basis of the bargain. '64 These requirements normally mean that the
representation by the seller (either verbal or written) amounts to an express
warranty only if the representation might have played a role in the decision of the
consumer to buy.65 The reasonable expectations of the buyer are considered when
determining whether or not the representations made by the seller played a role in
the decision to purchase.66
Implied warranties are included in sales contracts unless the buyer
specifically excludes them through the methods outlined in the UCC.6 7 The
inclusion of an implied warranty in a sales contract is also independent of the
seller's actual intent.68 Unlike express warranties, an implied warranty attaches to
the purchase regardless of what the seller represents in the purchase
infiingement from the sale. See DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON SALES,
LEASES, AND LICENSES 77-79 (1999) [hereinafter MATERALS]. This Note focuses most
specifically on the ability of sellers to disclaim implied warranties of quality in the sales of used
cars.
62 Id. at 79.
63 Id. at 79-80.
64 I. at 80. The "basis of the bargain" in the UCC replaced the Uniform Sales Act
provision that required a buyer to prove reliance. See U.C.C. § 2-313 (1999).
65 MATERIALS, supra note 61, at 80. The representations need to have some substance to
them to qualify as more than just mere "puffing," a term used to describe common
representations by salespeople that are generally vague statements about certain product
features such as "this car is a real beauty!" Puffing does not amount to an express warranty
under normal circumstances because it is merely a subjective assessment by the seller of some
aspect of the goods. It has been pointed out that some courts consider statements to the effect
that the product is 'first class" or "A-1" as express warranties, and not puffing. See Charles
Pierson, Comment, Does "Puff' Create an Express Warranty of Merchantability? Where the
Hornbooks Go Wrong, 36 DUQ. L. REv. 887, 891-92 (1998). The author states that the courts in
these cases examined the purchaser's reliance and the seller's superior knowledge in making
their decisions. Sellers need to be careful about representations that describe the goods because
those, however informal, probably amount to warranties. Specific language or other formalities
are generally not required under the UCC. See WHALEY, supra note 60, at 23.
66 WHALEY, supra note 60, at 24. A representation by a car dealer that both the engine and
transmission of an older used car have been completely rebuilt would probably play a role in
the decision of a buyer to purchase the car and would be considered an express warranty. On
the other hand, a promise to repair the car in the future probably would not count as an express
warranty because it is not an "affirmation of fact or promise" relating to the quality of the
product at issue. See U.C.C. § 2-313 (1999).
67 MATERIALS, supra note 61, at 83. Professor Whaley describes these warranties as
"children of the law." Id.
68 Id.
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negotiations.69 Implied warranties normally protect minimum consumer
expectations of the product that they are purchasing. Minimum expectations are
what a normal (reasonable) buyer would expect at the very least when making a
purchase. In a typical car sale, there will be issues involving both types of
warranties, and the typical used car dealer will attempt to disclaim all of them to
reduce any obligation to repair or replace the vehicle in the future.70
Two important implied warranties that apply to the purchase of cars (unless
they are disclaimed, which they frequently are) are the implied warranty of
merchantability contained in § 2-314,71 and the implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose in § 2-315.72 These implied warranties apply to used goods as
well as new ones, although the reasonable expectations of the performance of
used goods is obviously less than the expectations for identical, but new, goods.73
The merchantability warranty provides certain minimum standards that the
product must meet. In general, this means a product must meet the normal
expectations of the parties by working properly.74
An implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose applies to situations in
which the seller represents that the product can be used for a specific purpose and
the buyer relies on this representation. 75 There are three conditions that need to
exist before this warranty is created.76 First, the seller must have had reason to
69 Id.
70 The UCC generally prohibits the disclaimer of express warranties because construing
affrmnative language that creates warranties along with language negating those same
warranties would be considered unreasonable under § 2-316(1). This Note focuses on the
ability of car dealers to disclaim implied warranties, an opportunity specifically allowed under
the Code. See infra text accompanying note 80.
There is also a problem with auto dealers who use written disclaimers in the contract but
orally represent that the consumer is still protected. See Michael J. Herbert, Toward a Unified
Theory of Warranty Creation Under Articles 2 and 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1990
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 265, 266 (1990). The problem arises when the parol evidence rule is also
considered, because that rule normally prevents the inclusion of any oral evidence into a fully
integrated contract when the oral representation is contrary to contract terms. U.C.C. § 2-202(b)
(1999). Buyers probably will not be able to assert as evidence the fact that they were told that
warranties covered the purchase under the parol evidence rule. Full integration generally means
that the parties intend the writing to be a final expression of their intentions. Id.
71 U.C.C. § 2-314 (1999).
72 U.C.C. § 2-315 (1999).
73 WHALEY, supra note 60, at 49-50.
74 MATERIALS, supra note 61, at 88. Professor Whaley explains that this warranty (that the
product will work) is all that the consumer really needs and posits the question, "When sellers
disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability (and they often do), why do buyers not
routinely complain?" Id. The warranty of merchantability has also been described as a promise
that the goods are of at least "mediocre" quality. See Herbert, supra note 70, at 279.
75 WHALEY, supra note 60, at 67-70.
76 Id. at 67-68.
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know that the buyer has a particular purpose in mind that is not included in the
more general merchantability warranty scope. 77 Second, the seller must have had
reason to know that the buyer is relying on the seller's representation. Third, the
buyer must actually purchase in reliance on the seller's representation. 78 What the
seller actually knew is of no consequence under the language of the UCC. 79
The UCC allows for these important protections to be disclaimed through the
use of specific language, including the use of the phrase, "as is" in § 2-316.80 This
is the most convenient way to disclaim warranties for sellers, because other
provisions make disclaimers more difficult.81 In many sales of used cars, the "as
is" disclaimer strips the consumer of all protection because there are no express
warranties offered. Although the UCC endorses this practice as sufficient to put
consumers on notice that they are unprotected, it is unlikely that the average
77 Id. The warranty of merchantability covers all ordinary uses of the goods. The warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose may arise, in the context of vehicle purchases, where a
consumer specifically asks a salesperson for a pick-up truck that will be able to transport heavy
equipment great distances on a daily basis, and the seller makes a recommendation for a vehicle
that the buyer ends up purchasing because of the perceived "expert" advice.
78 Id at 68.
79 Id. The seller can be charged with having "reason to know" by the courts from the
buyer's statements or conduct or other particulars of the transaction at issue. Another source for
the creation of implied warranties is the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods. See United Nations Conference on Contracts for the Int'l Sale of
Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.97/18, 19 I.L.M. 668 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1988)
[hereinafter CISG]. As its name makes obvious, it is a body of law that applies to parties who
have their places of business in different nations when these parties contract for the sale of
goods. The CISG applies to intemational business transactions between parties from countries
that are signatories to the agreement. See CISG, art.1, para.l. Article 35 provides for basic
warranties that are similar to those created by the UCC. The analogue to the implied warranty
of merchantability is contained in Article 35, Paragraph 2, Clause (a) and the fitness for a
particular purpose warranty's analogue is found in Clause (b). CISG, art.35. Unlike the UCC,
the CISG does not include any provisions that dictate how a disclaimer of warranty must be
written to be effective. It therefore is probably more difficult to disclaim implied warranties in
an intemational transaction.
80 U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a) (1999). UCC § 2-316 contains the requirements for a seller who
chooses to attempt a disclaimer of implied warranties. Subsection (3)(a) lists the "language that
in common understanding" makes it plain to the buyer that there are no warranties. "[W]ith all
faults" can also be used as an equivalent to "as is." Subsection (3)(b) removes the implied
warranty if a buyer examines the goods fully or refuses a chance to examine them if the defects
could have been discovered with a reasonable examination. Subsection (3)(c) provides for
modification of implied warranties through course of dealing, course of performance, or trade
usage.
81 U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1999). This provision mandates that a disclaimer of the warranty of
merchantability must specifically mention the warranty and be conspicuous if written.
Excluding warranties of fitness must be in writing and conspicuous to be effective. Id.
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consumer knows anything about implied warranties or even what the UCC is and
how it protects them. 82
The UCC has been characterized as providing "gap-fillers" that are implied in
the contract in the event that the parties do not deal with a particular situation.83
Although dealers have not specifically negotiated the disclaimer with buyers in
purchases, dealers are allowed to disclaim warranties because of the gap-filling
provisions of the UCC. It has been argued that this practice defeats some
reasonable expectations of consumers, and that the UCC's requirements should
be changed to protect consumers from unfair surprise.84
States have taken different approaches when implementing the UCC and
have acted to protect consumers beyond what is required by the UCC, most
notably when implementing § 27316. State legislatures commonly make subtle
changes to specific UCC provisions, and this is expected because the UCC is only
a model for state laws and not a mandate to the states.85 The District of Columbia,
Maine, Massachusetts, and West Virginia have a complete statutory ban on
warranty disclaimers in place because they all have changed the provisions of § 2-
316.86 Any attempt by a seller of consumer goods, including both new and used
cars, to disclaim implied warranties is unenforceable in these jurisdictions.
Although "as is" clauses are enforceable under the model § 2-316, they are not
82 See Mann & Holdych, supra note 16, at 13. Professors Mann and Holdych also imply
that this is not the case with all consumers, as evidenced by the fact that used car dealers still
offer warranties and service contracts. These warranties are offered without any state mandate,
so the consumers must be aware that they need some sort of protection. Used car buyers also
tend to "shop around" more than new car buyers and this competition factor may also explain
why warranties are offered. For a discussion of how consumers force the used car market to
adjust to their needs, see id. at 21-22.
83 Id at 10.
84 Yvonne W. Rosmarin, The Revision of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code:
Consumers-R-Us: A Reality in the U C C. Article 2 Revision Process, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1593, 1597 (1994). As Rosmarin stated: "Disclaimer of implied warranties, especially of the
implied warranty of merchantability, is one of the most important and needed areas of revision
in Article 2."Id. at 1609-10.
85 See supra note 13.
86 D.C. CODEANN. § 28:2-316.01 (2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-316(5) (West
1995 & Supp. 2003); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 106, § 2-316A (Law. Co-op 1998); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 46A-6-107 (Michie 1999 & Supp. 2003). A compilation and analysis of most of the
state law modifications of the UCC that are mentioned in this Note can be found in Clifford,
supra note 57, at 1019-20. Maryland generally prohibits the disclaimer of implied warranties in
the sales of consumer goods. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 2-316.1(2) (2002). However, this
prohibition does not apply to the sale of used vehicles that are over six model years old with
greater than 60,000 miles. Id. § 2-316.1(4)(a)(ii). Disclaiming implied warranties for the
identified used cars is allowed but is more difficult than the model § 2-316 disclaimer because
the disclaimer needs to be separately acknowledged and signed by the consumer in order for it
to be effective. Id. § 2-316.1 (4)(bXiii). See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
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enforceable in these few states that have modified versions of the original code.87
Connecticut and Vermont have altered § 2-316 to prevent sellers from
disclaiming implied warranties in the sale of new goods only, leaving used car
buyers without any extra protection. 88 South Carolina and Washington require a
disclaimer to be more specific than the original § 2-316 to be effective.89 The
changes made to the UCC by the legislatures of these states are most likely a
response to inherent problems in the UCC.
Taking a closer look at the language of the implied warranties in the UCC
reveals a potentially serious problem for used car buyers. The implied warranty of
merchantability only applies to merchants, as they are defined in the UCC.90 The
problem with the merchantability warranty only applying to merchants is the
exclusion of other consumers who commonly sell their current vehicle in the
process of purchasing a new one.91 Although trading in old vehicles to the dealer
for credit on a new car is commonplace, many people would prefer to try to sell
their cars themselves to elicit a higher price.92 It has been argued that the
merchant restriction for implied warranties of merchantability should be removed
because it is "caveat emptor's only remaining protagonist."9 3 It also seems to go
against a basic precept of warranty law, which is to determine what the seller
87 Clifford, supra note 57, at 1022.
88 CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42A-2-316(5) (West 2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 2-
316(5) (2000).
89 South Carolina requires language to be specific and construes ambiguity against the
seller. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-316(2) (Law. Co-op. 2003). Washington requires particularity
for an effective disclaimer. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.2-316(4) (West 2002).
90 See U.C.C. § 2-314 (1999). The U.C.C. defines a merchant as:
a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out
as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction
or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or
broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such
knowledge or skill.
Id. § 2-104(1) (1999).
This is somewhat peculiar because the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
applies to all sellers. See id. § 2-315 (1999); see also Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, The Merchant
of Section 2-314: Who Needs Him?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 747, 759 (1983). Professor Hillinger
points out that the damages that can be awarded for a breach by the seller of both sections lead
to the same result. Id. at 772-73. The possibility of paying substantial damages can therefore
not be an explanation for excluding non-merchants from § 2-314. Id.
91 Professor Hillinger provides a sample transaction where the car buyer would have no
relief when purchasing from a non-merchant when the automobile did not work as expected.
Hillinger, supra note 90, at 762-63.
92 See Raymund L. Flandez, State Getting Tough on Curbside Automobile Sales,
MARYLAND GAZETTE, Dec. 4, 2002, at A2. The practice of non-merchants selling cars in
driveways and mall parking lots has been dubbed "curbstoning." Id.
93 Hillinger, supra note 90, at 808.
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intended to sell.94 A non-merchant seller most likely intends that the car for sale
will work as well for the new buyer as it has worked in the past for the seller.95 If
this does not happen, there are no warranties to help the buyer get what the seller
intended the buyer to have. 96
"As is" disclaimers, although endorsed by the UCC as containing a clear
meaning to consumers, have actually been reduced to a "boilerplate" provision
which is meaningless to consumers in most instances. Professors Goetz and Scott
examine the interaction between express and implied contract terms by assuming
that contracting parties try to minimize the chance that their final expression will
be defective.97 Parties initially must bear the costs of trial-and-error and use
different contract formulations until they find a framework that protects the
expectations of their agreement.98 After time, other parties use these same,
commonly-accepted terms until they become boilerplate and are contained in
many different transactions.99 Other parties use these same "pre-formulations"
that import implied terms into the contract because they save costs by not having
to negotiate each provision individually.100 The problem is that these pre-
formulations eventually lose their meaning because the parties currently using
them are so far removed from the parties that actually understood and developed
the terms.101 The phrase "as is" may have once been understood and developed
by parties in commercial transactions, but car buyers today do not have that same
ability to bargain and implement contract specifics. 102
9 4 Id. at 761.
95 Id. at 762-63.
96 Id.
97 Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the
Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REv. 261, 272 (1985).98 Id. at 278.
99 Id. at 288-89.
100 Id. at 278. ("For most parties, such implied terms are not only cheaper, but they are
also better than do-it-yourself ones."). The authors point out a problem with this phenomenon
being that it chills the expression of newer, possibly more effective pre-formulations because
parties no longer waste resources in trial-and-error practice. Id. at 289.
101 Id. at 288-89.
102 Professor Phillips asserts that consumers do not read warranty disclaimers because
they are more concerned with other aspects of the car, like the price and included features.
Sellers also "are not in the habit" of bringing the clause to the attention of consumers and
explaining it to them. Phillips, supra note 22, at 242-43. "[T]he consumer's main concern is the
swift acquisition of a highly desired product." Id at 244. It is also unlikely that typical
consumers would be able to fully understand what they are giving up by signing the sales
contract because there is so much unfamiliar legal terminology. Id. at 243.
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2. The Latest Revisions to Article 2 are Ineffective
The American Law Institute ("ALP') and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") have completed a revision
of a significant portion of the UCC. 10 3 Article 2 has been revised, but the
revisions will not help place consumers on a more equal footing with car dealers
with respect to bargaining power. One reason that the latest revisions do not
effectively protect consumers' rights is that the UCC was created to modernize
the vast body of law that dealt with commercial transactions, not to be a set of
regulatory laws for consumer protection.' 0 4 Consumer representatives who were
included in the drafting process of the revisions did not attempt to change the
basic concept of the UCC. 10 5 These consumer advocates sought fair treatment in
commercial transactions for consumers because the UCC assumes that most
commercial transactions are fair when the two parties to the deal are sophisticated
businesspeople. 10 6 Unfortunately, many commercial transactions now involve
consumers who are significantly less sophisticated than their counterparts-the
sellers.107 The changes espoused in this Note follow along the lines of the
approach taken by the consumer representatives in the drafting party.
A specific change was made in the revision to § 2-316, requiring that, to be
effective, an "as is" disclaimer of implied warranties "in a consumer contract
evidenced by a record [must be] set forth conspicuously in the record." 10 8 This is
important because consumers may not be able to read disclaimer language that is
buried in dense, small text in the middle of the boilerplate section of the contract.
It is also possible that the boilerplate section will be printed on the reverse side of
the invoice. Conspicuousness will require sellers to remove their disclaimers from
this position in the contract. This is a valuable protection for consumers, but it is
103 The American Bar Association recently approved the revision at the mid-year meeting
of its House of Delegates. See Uniform Law Commissioners, Announcements, ABA Approves
Six NCCUSL Acts, Feb. 9, 2004, at
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/DesktopModules/NewsDisplay.aspx?ItemlD=91 (last visited
Feb. 26, 2005). This article notes that the original version of Article 2 was promulgated in 1951,
and that the revisions under review have been going on for decades. Although the revision has
been completed, no legally effective change has been made because no state has adopted any of
the most recent (2003) revisions.
104 Some of the purposes of the UCC are to "simplify, clarify, and modernize"
commercial law and to make the law uniform among various jurisdictions. See U.C.C. § 1-
103(a)(l)-(3) (1999). "[T]he UCC took a hands-off approach to consumer sales problems."
Clifford, supra note 57, at 1016.
105 Rosmarin, supra note 84, at 1595. Ms. Rosmarin is an attomey who served as an
official observer to the Article 2 Drafting Committee.
106 Id. at 1595-56.
107 1d.
108 U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a) (amended 2003).
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unlikely that this provision will increase the amount of bargaining that consumers
will engage in with the dealer. It does not necessarily follow that a consumer who
has noticed a conspicuous disclaimer understands it.' 09 Like the FTC Used Car
Rule, "10 this new provision assumes that consumers know their rights under the
UCC." l  Unfortunately, they do not, and revisions requiring more basic
information would be more effective to arm consumers with the information that
they need to know to bargain effectively. The UCC needs to take a broader
approach to consumer protection because state and federal laws are particularly
inadequate with respect to automobile transactions. Changes would be most
effective to UCC sections as opposed to existing federal and state laws that are
ineffective. 1 2
3. Non- UCC Provisions and Their Problems
Other state laws that have been passed to protect consumers do not have the
potential to spark the nationwide effects that a change in the UCC could have.
State lemon laws are common, but these laws only apply after the transaction has
been made and the consumer has been injured. 113 Ohio's lemon law 114 allows a
consumer to obtain a refund of the purchase price for a new vehicle if a
manufacturer is unable to repair a serious defect in the vehicle after a reasonable
number of attempts. 115 The relief can only be granted after the contract has been
consummated and the consumer has been injured. The effectiveness of state
109 Rosmarin, supra note 84, at 1597. "In many cases, a giant 'AS IS' statement or a
disclaimer clause in bold face and all capital letters disclaiming the... implied warranties may
be unfair no matter how large or bold the words are." Id.
110 See infra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
111 See id.
112 Rosmarin, supra note 84, at 1602 ("[The NCCUSL's] power and influence, along with
its credibility and that of the ALI, could give a revised Article 2 containing consumer provisions
a strong chance for success.").
I13 New car lemon laws have now been passed in all fifty states and the District of
Columbia. The National Consumer Law Center lists each of these laws, organized by state.
JONATHAN SHELDON & CAROLYN L. CARTER, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAw CENTER, CONSUMER
WARRANTY LAw 771 app. F (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter WARRANTY MANUAL]. There are also
compilations of service contract laws and forms that can be used to file a lawsuit for breach of
warranty against a car manufacturer. See id. at 791 app. G, 839 app. K.
14 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1345.71-1345.78 (West 2003) (Nonconforming New
Motor Vehicle Law).
115 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.72 (West 2003). A consumer is entitled to this remedy
if the same defect in the vehicle has been subject to three or more repair attempts in one year, or
if the vehicle has been out of service being repaired for thirty days or more in a year. OHIo REV.
CODEANN. § 1345.73 (West 2003).
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lemon laws has been disputed by commentators since the inception of the laws.
116
Lemon laws also commonly only apply to new cars, affording no help to a used
car purchaser.
Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices ("UDAP") statutes are also common
and can provide a remedy to consumers who are victims of fraudulent
dealings.1 17 Like the state lemon laws, these laws also work long after the
completion of the contract, meaning that the consumer has already been
victimized. UDAP laws were initially very popular because they provided an
easier cause of action to prove for the consumer than common law fraud."
18
Although these laws are very popular, legislation needs to be aimed at helping the
consumers to bargain before signing the contract, instead of providing relief after
they have already been outmatched in the bargaining context by the car dealers.
Because of differing amounts of consumer protection between states, the
price of a vehicle does not necessarily reflect the risks that are involved regarding
legal action.' 19 Although the UCC has been adopted by all fifty states in some
form, there are some major differences between states. There are also a variety of
model consumer protection acts, which adds to the disparity.120 Different states
116 Some have argued that the passage of state lemon laws may cause manufacturers to
improve the quality of their products in the future. See Julian B. Bell fI, Comment, Ohio's
Lemon Law: Ohio Joins the Rest of the Nation in Waging War Against the Automobile Limited
Warranty, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 1015, 1034 (1989). Others have argued that lemon laws actually
benefit manufacturers by increasing consumer confidence and ultimately prices on cars without
costing the manufacturers much in profits because they are not very helpful to consumers. See
Julie A. Vergeront, A Sour Note: A Look at the Minnesota Lemon Law, 68 MINN. L. REV. 846,
847 (1984).
117 See generally Anthony Paul Dunbar, Comment, Consumer Protection: The Practical
Effectiveness of State Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation, 59 TUL. L. REV. 427 (1984)
(providing an in-depth analysis of UDAP statutes in each of the fifty states). A violation of
Maine's altered § 2-316 also counts as a violation of the state UDAP law. ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 11, § 2-316(5)(a) (West 2003); see also supra note 86 and accompanying text.
118 Diana Curry, Note, The Effect of an "As Is" Clause on a DTPA Cause of Action, 54
BAYLOR L. REv. 239, 240 (2002) (DTPA is an acronym that is basically synonymous with
UDAP.). Proving that the seller had scienter, or knowledge of the deception, and a specific
intent to deceive are two elements that make a successful cause of action for fraud difficult to
maintain. See Robert G. Byrd, Misrepresentation in North Carolina, 70 N.C. L. REv. 323, 326-
27 (1992).
119 David A. Rice, Product Quality Laws and the Economics of Federalism, 65 B.U. L.
REV. 1, 7-8 (1985). Professor Rice points out that the chance that the seller will have to repair
or replace the product is included in the price. In a state with greater consumer protection, the
cost of this chance of repair will be greater to the seller and that will be passed on to consumers
by an increase in the purchase price. Because sellers cannot change the price according to
which state the consumer is located in, all buyers will have to pay the same greater price. The
legal action is what the purchasers in the states with enhanced protection enjoy from their state
courts. Other consumers pay for, but do not enjoy the same right to legal relief.
120 See id at4.
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wrote their consumer protection laws by following the lead of different model
laws, creating inconsistency between states.121 Consumers in states with less
consumer protection are actually paying more than they should be, because they
are unlikely to be afforded relief after the purchase. The buyers in states with
more consumer protection pay the same prices as the former consumers but do
not face as much risk of paying for repairs or replacement. 122 This results in a
subsidy paid by the less-protected consumers to the well-protected consumers. 123
Consumers in states with less protection 2 4 should at least be able to bargain for
that illusory protection for which they are paying. Unfortunately, they cannot
bargain effectively under the current system. And while federal law applies in
each state, it does not address this issue directly.
B. Federal Consumer Protection Problems
Federal statutory protections are not effective at improving the consumer's
ability to bargain. One source of federal protection is the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act, 125 which was passed in 1975 in order to alleviate some problems
that consumers faced in understanding warranties.126 This Act prohibits a seller
from disclaiming implied warranties if a written warranty is given or a service
contract is sold along with the product. 127 Implied warranties may only be limited
in duration to that of the express warranties offered with the purchase. 128 These
provisions do not apply to car purchases if no written warranty is offered with the
121 Id
122 The different consumers in different states end up paying the same price because of
price discrimination laws that do not allow the seller to change the price according to the region.
Id at5.
123 Professor Rice stated that "[p]urchasers in states which provide consumers with a high
level of legal protection are, in effect, beneficiaries of a product quality protection subsidy
underwritten by consumers who receive more limited intangible legal rights and remedies." Id.
at8.
124 An example would be a state that considers an "as is" disclaimer an absolute bar on
any remedy for implied warranty breaches.
12 5 Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2301-2312 (2000).
126 Ismael v. Goodman Toyota, 417 S.E.2d 290, 293 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992). "The Act was
passed in an attempt to make warranties on consumer products more understandable and
enforceable and further to establish a more effective procedural mechanism for consumer
claims which typically involve a small amount of damages and for which a remedy may
otherwise be unavailable." ld., citing 17 AM. JuR. 2D Consumer Product Warranty Acts § 1
(1990).
127 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a) (2000).
128 15 U.S.C. § 2308(b) (2000). Consumers can also get attorney's fees included in a
damage award if they prevail in court. 15 U.S.C. § 23 10(d)(2) (2000).
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purchase. 129 Used car dealers can avoid provisions that would help used car
buyers simply by not offering any written warranty protection.
Another problem with this provision is that it undermines the protection that
is afforded to consumers in the total ban jurisdictions. 130 The Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") initially proposed to include a list of total ban states with
the warranty limitation to inform consumers of their rights as citizens of those
states.131 However, this provision was not included as a result of dealers
complaining about the burden of monitoring state laws.' 32 The resulting
compromise does not inform the buyer of anything, but just alerts them that the
implied warranty limitation may or may not apply to them, depending on where
they live. 133
The FTC has also promulgated regulations that were intended to force used
car sellers to disclose more information to buyers. 134 Although no warranty rights
are created by the FTC Used Car Rule, disclosures are required that help to notify
the consumer of what warranties will accompany a purchase.135 Disclosures are
required to be prominently displayed on the window of the cars in what is called a
"buyer's guide," 136 which contains terms that are cross-referenced in the sales
contract. 137 An important aspect of this Rule is the requirement that sellers define
the meaning of the phrase "as is" and conspicuously mark that the car is being
sold without any warranties, despite what the dealer may have represented in the
negotiations. 138 This is effective to alert the consumer to the fact that they will
bear all of the risk of repairing the vehicle. 139 The buyer's guide and disclosures
are also required to be in Spanish for sales that are conducted in that language. 1
40
Despite the important disclosures that are required by the Rule, fundamental
information about the UCC and about consumer protections are not included.
Like other disclaimers, this assumes that the average consumer is aware of the
129 15 U.S.C. § 2309(b) (2000).
130 Clifford, supra note 57, at 1054. The total ban jurisdictions consist of Maine,
Massachusetts, and the District of Columbia. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
131 Clifford, supra note 57, at 1054.132 Id.
133 Id. The clause reads: "Some states do not allow limitations on how long an implied
warranty lasts, so the above limitation may not apply to you." Id.
134 Used Motor Vehicle FTC Trade Regulation Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 455 (2003).
135 WARRANTY MANUAL, supra note 113, at 526.
136 16 C.F.R. § 455.2 (2003).
137 Id. § 455.3.
138 Id. § 455.2.
139 The buyer's guide, or window sticker, needs to contain the language, "YOU WILL
PAY ALL COSTS FOR ANY REPAIRS." WARRANTY MANUAL, supra note 113, at 696 app.
D (containing a reproduction of the mandatory form required by the FTC).
140 16 C.F.R. § 455.5 (2003).
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substantive warranty protection that is offered under state law. This is not true in
most cases. Disclaimers need to be more basic and informative, and would be
most effective by changing the UCC, because it is the source of the substantive
warranty protection.' 4 1 Courts have interpreted the effects that federal law has on
state proceedings in addition to any applicable state law.
C. Inadequate Court Protection of Consumer Rights
Litigation brought by disgruntled car buyers has been very common in many
different jurisdictions in the United States. Many cases involve disputes over who
should bear the cost of making repairs to the vehicle by examining what warranty
protection the consumer was afforded. 142 The variety of the damage to cars
ranges from relatively minor inconveniences to cases where car engines have
exploded or cars have caught nearby buildings on fire.143 There has been much
litigation involving car buying issues in recent years, with consumers losing out
on numerous occasions. 144 This is because it is unrealistic to depend on courts to
always take the inherent bargaining power disparity into consideration in
141 A change of this type was contemplated in the FTC Rule because it specifically
provides that the Rule will not be in effect in a state that provides for better consumer protection
upon application by a state agency. Id, §§ 455.5-455.6.
142 See generally Chrysler Corp. v. Schiffer, 736 So.2d 538 (Ala. 1999); Ford Motor Co.
v. Reed, 465 S.W.2d 80 (Ark. 1971); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168 (Cal.
1964); Web Press Serv. Corp. v. New London Motors, Inc., 533 A.2d 1211 (Conn. 1987);
Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 185 A.2d 919 (D.C. 1962); Frank Griffin
Volkswagen v. Smith, 610 So.2d 597 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Rothe v. Maloney Cadillac,
Inc., 518 N.E.2d 1028 (Ill. 1988); Boos v. Benson Jeep-Eagle Co., Inc., 717 So.2d 661 (La. Ct.
App. 1998); Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730 (N.Y. 1995); Ismael v. Goodman
Toyota, 417 S.E.2d 290 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992); Nationwide Ins. Co. v. General Motors Corp.,
625 A.2d 1172 (Pa. 1993); LaBella v. Charlie Thomas, Inc., 942 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. App. 1997);
Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 544 P.2d 20 (Wash. 1975).
143 A minor problem involved a leased car that stalled at an intersection and "ran a little
rough." LaBella, 942 S.W.2d at 130. A more serious problem involved the explosion of a truck
engine because of a casting defect Schroeder, 544 P.2d at 22. A tragic case involved a car that
burst into flames inside the garage of the owner's residence, resulting in total destruction of
both the car and the residence. Reid, 465 S.W.2d at 81.
144 See Kunert v. Mission Fin. Serv. Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 589 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003),
review denied, No. S 118366, 2003 Cal. LEXIS 8286 (Cal. Oct. 29, 2003) (holding that dealers
may receive commissions for assigning consumer financing contracts to lenders); Jackson v.
South Holland Dodge, 755 N.E.2d 462 (Ill. 2001) (allowing a dealer to not disclose the amount
of money that they retain in a commission from a warranty sale); DiCintio v. Daimler Chrysler
Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1121 (N.Y. 2002), reargument denied, 772 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 2002) (finding
that a car lease does not apply to the federal warranty protection afforded consumers by the
Magnuson-Moss Act).
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determining the outcome of a case.145 A Ninth Circuit decision found Spanish-
only speakers negligent for not obtaining a translation of the purchase contract.
14 6
Courts express a strong desire to protect the freedom to contract and the ability of
the parties to create their own specially-tailored rights and remedies. 147 Courts
need to recognize that the bargaining power disparity can be so severe that the
terms are not bargained for and not assented to by the consumer and invalidate
them in some instances.
Friedrich Kessler identifies the tendency of courts to preserve the freedom of
contract in the face of potentially unfair contracts. 148 Kessler notes that when one
party to a contract has more bargaining power than the other party, the stronger
party can create a standard contract which prevents the weaker party from
"shop[ping] around" for better terms. 149 The weaker party cannot shop around
because the stronger party maintains a monopoly or because the other sellers offer
the same terms. 150 The weaker party cannot hunt for better terms in the case of
car sales because almost all dealers use the exact same clauses. These contracts
are known as contracts of adhesion, or contracts that are b prendre ou 6t laisser,
which is basically the French equivalent of "take it or leave it." 151
Courts have traditionally attempted to allow parties the freedom to create
their own bargains, ignoring their sense of justice or social responsibility. 152
Courts that attempt to protect the integrity of freedom of contract, even in the face
of socially undesirable bargains, should realize that the common law is flexible
enough to accommodate change. 153 Common law tools can be used by courts to
mitigate the harshness of the freedom of contract theory. Common law evolution
145 But see Martin v. Joseph Harris Co., Inc., 767 F.2d 296 (6th Cir. 1985). In that case,
the court considered the bargaining power disparity between the parties as a factor in its
unconscionability analysis. Id. at 300-01. In describing the parties to the dispute, the court went
on to state "that Harris Seed is a large national producer and distributor of seed, dealing here
with independent, relatively small farmers." Id. at 301. The Sixth Circuit was examining the
effects of the implied warranty disclaimers that the seed company had used in its defective seed
sales with the aggrieved farmers. Id. One judge concurred, revealing his personal views on
contracts by noting that "I am normally loath to interfere with the contract the parties have
made." Id. at 304 (Merritt, J., concurring).
146 Bender, supra note 49, at 1038, citing Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841
F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1988).
147 Judge Merritt's concurrence in Martin exemplifies this principle. See supra note 145.
148 Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLuM. L. REv. 629, 631 (1943).
149 Id. at 632.
150 Id.
151 Id. (translation provided by author).
112 Id. at 637.
153 Id. at 638. Kessler cites the doctrine of consideration as a form of contract law that has
evolved with influence from both the freedom of contract theory as well as the consumer
protection theory. Id.
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may help to prevent standard contracts from becoming "effective instruments in
the hands of powerful industrial and commercial overlords enabling them to
impose a new feudal order of their own making upon a vast host of vassals."'154
There are a variety of ways in which "as is" disclaimers are treated by courts
in different jurisdictions. Even though the UCC seems clear in stating that this
language disclaims any implied warranties (although it does not disclaim express
warranties' 55), courts have still refused to enforce its effectiveness in certain
situations. 156 Courts have also been reluctant to enforce similar language to "as
is" because it may not be as clear to the consumer as the express requirements of
the UCC are supposed to be. 157 These cases are relatively rare because courts
usually find that "as is" is sufficient to disclaim implied warranties as long as
there is evidence that the consumer has assented to its inclusion.
In fact, courts will even use the disclaimer to insulate the seller from other
causes of action in certain circumstances. For example, the Texas Supreme Court
held that the "as is" clause in a purchase agreement acted to negate a cause of
action under the state UDAP statute. 158 The court found no cause in fact because
the buyer assumed all of the risk by agreeing to the contract with the
disclaimer. 159 The holding was limited to the facts of the case, which involved the
purchase of a building. 160 But despite this apparent limitation, there is still a
chance that used car buyers could be denied protection of other laws because of
their apparent assent to an implied warranty disclaimer.
Courts have not traditionally been willing to find warranty disclaimers
unconscionable under UCC § 2-302,161 and there have been arguments that
154 Kessler, supra note 148, at 640.
155 See supra note 70.
156 See Janet L. Richards, "As Is " Provisions-What Do They Really Mean?, 41 ALA. L.
REV. 435 (1990). Professor Richards cites cases that fall into three different categories: (1) cases
in which courts have required the provision to be conspicuous, id. at 452-53; (2) cases in which
courts have focused on whether or not the buyer was unfairly surprised, id. at 457; and (3) cases
in which courts have refused to allow the disclaimer of warranties that were common in the
trade, id at 460-61. Professor Richards espouses an approach that would allow consumers to
present evidence that they did not, in fact, assent to the disclaimer by claiming unfair surprise,
an argument that should appeal to courts. Id. at 470.
157 Id. at 462-64.
158 Curry, supra note 118, at 239. Ms. Curry examines Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Jefferson Assocs., Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. 1995) and its possible impact on future related
litigation. The DTPA cause of action that Curry is referring to is the same as the UDAP statutes
that are now common. See Dunbar, supra note 117 and accompanying text.
159 Curry, supra note 118, at 244.
160 Id. at 246. Curry notes that the court espoused the use of a "totality of the
circumstances test" to determine the reach of the "as is" clause. Id.
161 Subsection 1 of § 2-302 states:
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courts should reverse this trend.162 Unconscionability has been described as a
contract that was "too hard a bargain and too one-sided an agreement to entitle the
plaintiff to relief in a court of conscience." 163 A finding of unconscionability
generally requires finding both "substantive" and "procedural"
unconscionability.164 The substantive part requires a showing of oppressive terms
against one party to the contract and the procedural part requires a showing of
unfairness in the process of bargaining. 165 Professor Phillips advocates a "more
aggressive judicial stance" to find unconscionability in implied warranty
disclaimers.166 He summarized numerous cases where the disclaimers involved
did not reach the level of unconscionability according to the court.167 For
example, the Arizona Supreme Court discounted the fact that the buyer was at a
bargaining power disadvantage in upholding a warranty disclaimer because it was
a common practice of the seller.168  Professor Mooney agrees that
unconscionability is not used widely enough and has noted that "American
contract decisions today tend to enhance rather than to mitigate the power of
economically dominant parties." 169 Although warranty disclaimers are arguably
unconscionable no matter how they are used, courts are not always willing to find
in the consumer's favor. Courts may be more apt to be consumer-friendly with a
clear mandate from the UCC.
IV. WHAT To Do WITH WARRANTY DISCLAIMERS
Because the current method of disclaiming warranties is not sufficient to put
the average consumer on notice of what she is giving up, making certain changes
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have
been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract,
or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it
may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable
result.
U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1999).
162 See generally Phillips, supra note 22; Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism
in Contract Law, 74 OR. L. REV. 1131 (1995).
163 Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1948).
16 4 DAwsoN ET. AL., CoNTRACrs: CASES AND COMMENT 706 (8th ed. 2003).
165 See id.
166 Phillips, supra note 22, at 267.
16 7 See id. at 233-34.
16 8 Id. at 233, citing Seekings v. Jimmy GMC, 638 P.2d 210 (Ariz. 1981). There have
been cases where disclaimers were found to be unconscionable, such as in the case of a
defective new car where the facts that the disclaimer was inconspicuous and received by the
buyer after the sale were important to a New Jersey court. Id at 234, citing Zabriskie Chevrolet,
Inc. v. Smith, 240 A.2d 195 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1968).
169 Mooney, supra note 162, at 1206.
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in the disclaimer requirements may help to alleviate the problems that are
identified in this Note.170 The growth of the Internet into many American homes
and businesses may help to provide car purchasers with more information than
they currently have.
A. Possible On-Line Help for Consumers
With the growth of technology and the resulting decrease in costs of owning
a computer with access to the intemet, consumers are able to access a variety of
legal information from state-sponsored sources and other private sources. An
example of how Americans are becoming more computer-savvy is the fact that
fifty-one million citizens filed their taxes electronically in 2003.171 Today, a
consumer who is accustomed to "surfing" the Intemet can find information
relating to any kind of legal question without substantial costs. 172 Commentators
have also recognized the ability of attorneys to find valuable legal research
materials online. 173
Attorney General websites can also be valuable sources of information for
consumers, with some listing certain consumer protection statutes, including laws
applicable to car purchases such as lemon laws and UDAP statutes. 174 Although
170 Prohibiting disclaimers altogether is an alternative to modifying the disclosure
language that is required. Some judges have taken this position in an effort to influence the
legislators in their state. The Texas Supreme Court refused to uphold a warranty disclaimer in
the sale of vehicle lifts. Cate v. Dover Corp., 790 S.W.2d 559, 562 (Tex. 1990). The
concurrence is basically a plea to the legislature to repeal § 2-316 because the provision is
unfair to consumers. Id. at 567 (Spears, J., concurring) ("If the legislature has the interests of
Texas citizens at heart, it will repeal section 2-316 because, no matter how conspicuous, such
disclaimers are abusive of consumers."). This Note proposes a less drastic approach that is more
likely to be considered seriously by the appropriate drafting bodies. The downfalls of the more
drastic approach are considered infra Part IV.B.3.
171 Justin D. Leonard, Cyberlawyering and the Small Business: Software Makes Hard
Law (But Good Sense), 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. REv. 323, 325 (2003). The author also
points out that computers are reported to be in half of all American households now. Id. This
information is in the context of a discussion of the ability of small businesses to use on-line
resources to guide them through activities that have traditionally required the assistance of
counsel.
172 Id. at 326. Law firms are also increasing the amount of information that they post on-
line for possible client-consumers. See id. at 339-41.
173 See, e.g., Carol A. Parker, Practice Tips: Legal Resources on the Internet, MICH. B.J.,
Mar. 2003, at 40 (explaining how Michigan attorneys can access valuable information on-line);
Mark Pruner, The Internet and the Practice of Law, 19 PACE L. REv. 69 (1998) (examining
sources of internet information and endorsing the use of various on-line resources for
attorneys).
174 A listing of attorney general websites for all fifty states is likely to be found by web-
savvy consumers at CarBuyingTips.com. See http://www.carbuyingtips.com/attomey-
general.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2005).
2005]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
these websites differ in sophistication, most of them have basic information on
how to file a complaint and some have a significant amount of information
relating to buying vehicles.' 75 Official Attorney General Opinions are also found
on the majority of the sites. 176 Some states have provided legal information that is
accessible on the web with the approval of the state judiciary. 177 Programs such
as these may be more widely used than commercial sites because consumers may
be more trusting of legal information that is explicitly approved by the courts of
their respective states.
B. Specific UCC Changes to Close the Bargaining Power Gap
Focus in legislation needs to be shifted to provisions that will help the
consumer to learn about her legal situation before making a purchase instead of
after. This change should cause a corresponding increase in the bargaining power
of the purchaser. Legislation designed to allow for a consumer to recover after she
has already purchased a vehicle does not cultivate better bargaining power for
consumers during the actual purchase. This ex post legislation is characteristic of
the lemon laws and the other state consumer laws that are very popular among
consumers and championed by state Attorneys General. States could make
changes to their respective commercial codes, or the ALI and NCCUSL could
consider changing the lax requirements for disclaiming implied warranties that
are now present in the UCC and in the latest proposed amendments that have
been made to that regime.
1. How the UCC Should Be Changed
A more effective UCC requirement for disclaiming warranties would be to
inform the consumers of their rights ex ante, so that they can have the benefit of
that extra information during bargaining. This information is known by the dealer
175 For example, the Illinois Attorney General webpage has a variety of useful
information that is easy to find and well-organized, including tips for car buyers and
information about consumer protection laws. There are also forms that are available in Spanish.
See The Office of the Illinois Attorney General, Consumer Protection Division, at
http://www.ag.state.il.us/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2005).
176 Jennifer Granholm, who served as Michigan's Attorney General from 1998-2002, was
dedicated to using plain language in her opinions because of her recognition that a substantial
number of laypeople need to understand the information that those opinions contained. See Eric
J. Eggan et al., Plain English in the Department of the Attorney General, MICH. B.J., Jan. 2000,
at 48. Hopefully, Attorneys General can follow the lead of Granholm and be just as dedicated to
facilitating understanding as was she.
177 The Arizona Supreme Court introduced an interactive system that provided
information and complete legal documents for citizens. Leonard, supra note 171, at 335-36.
The author also mentions a system in Oregon that would be very beneficial to car buyers
because it offers legal information in different languages. Id. at 336-37.
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and the buyer should also be able to learn of it. Most consumers probably do not
know what the UCC is, let alone what implied warranties of "merchantability"
and "fitness for a particular purpose" are. The majority of consumers also do not
read the warranty disclaimers that are included in the sales contracts. 178 This
requirement would not impose a burdensome, lengthy boilerplate addition to the
standard purchase forms but would be a concise, conspicuous notification to the
consumer. The notification would include a brief summary of the rights that
consumers have under the law with a specific explanation that implied warranties
protect the consumer even if they are not expressly included by the dealer. It
would also specify that the consumer is giving up the ability to return the car if it
does not work as it is expected to. The notification should state that any oral
representations by the dealer cannot be enforced by signing an "as is" clause. The
UCC should also require that dealers provide a Spanish language translation on
demand from the consumer, similar to what the FTC Used Car Rule provides.179
Adding a little more to the already complex and lengthy procedure should not be
unduly expensive to dealers at the margin. Better disclosure language in the
contract would encourage bargaining and would create better deals for car buyers.
A provision that guarantees that consumers will discuss this specific part of
the contract is also necessary to ensure that the provision is bargained for in
negotiations. In addition to the basic disclosure, there should be a conspicuous
area for consumers to initial. The area should also contain language providing that
consumers should only initial if they have actively negotiated the disclaimer of
implied warranties. Dealers would not be able to enforce a disclaimer that does
not contain the initials of the purchaser next to the disclaimer. This would also
notify consumers that they should seek something in return for giving up their
rights under the UCC. Before prospective purchasers initial the disclaimer, they
can bargain for a lower price or better financing options as consideration.
Provisions similar to this have been implemented by Maryland and Mississippi in
their adoption of the UCC.180
Another solution may be the use of state-sponsored websites. With the
proliferation of access to the internet in many American households, consumers
can readily learn about the laws surrounding their transactions in addition to the
178 See Cate v. Dover Corp., 790 S.W.2d 559, 565 (Tex. 1990).
179 See supra note 140 and accompanying text
180 These states require any exclusion or modification of the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose to be separately acknowledged with a
written confirmation on the contract that is signed by the buyer. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I
§ 2-316.1(4)(b)(iii) (1998); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-315.1(3)(b)(iii) (2003). A similar
provision is included in the UCC when determining whether or not an agreement is a firm offer.
If the offer is drafted by the buyer and forwarded to the seller to present to the buyer as a formal
offer, the agreement is not a firm offer unless the seller "separately sign[s]" the part of the
agreement that contains the clause. U.C.C. § 2-205 (1999). This provision ensures that buyers
have actually read and understood the terms that become part of their offers. See id.
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"tips" that are easily accessible from numerous websites. Each state has an
Attorney General website, and these sites could be a forum for consumer
information along with other websites, including specialized multimedia sites
endorsed by courts. The UCC could also contain a provision that mandates online
informational databases with the goal of a better-educated population of
consumers. States could follow the lead of Illinois, 181 and provide helpful,
detailed information to consumers on the Internet. Other jurisdictions may make
an easier transition if they are motivated by a UCC provision that mandates
reform.
2. Effect on Identified Bargaining Power Problems
This solution will also help to mitigate specific problems identified in this
Note that make the bargaining disadvantage worse for consumers. Because the
new disclaimer will be written in simple, easy-to-read language, consumers will
not have difficulty understanding it even if their literacy skills are not highly
advanced. The fact that the disclaimer is entirely contained on one page will also
make it less confusing to the average consumer. Latin consumers can request a
Spanish version of the disclaimer to be able to bargain just as effectively as any
other consumer. The fact that they do not speak English fluently will not make
them any worse off when they are bargaining with a car dealer. Improving the
bargaining position of minority consumers will also potentially mitigate the
effects of discrimination. A vehicle dealer may be more willing to make
concessions in dealing with minority consumers who appear to be and are, in fact,
well-informed.
3. A Change Is Superior to a Total Ban on Disclaimers
Disclaimers of implied warranties should not be banned entirely because the
freedom to contract needs to be protected on both sides of the transaction. Not
allowing disclaimers would result in the allocation of extra costs to sellers who
would, in turn, pass them on to buyers in the form of a higher price.182 The costs
would not only include the increased liability for problems with the cars, but also
the costs of training the employees who deal with the consumers each day and
providing for closer supervision of the sales force.183 Buyers who are looking for
a used car are more likely to be concerned with the price of the vehicle. Used car
buyers may not be able to afford a new car, and any reduction in the price may be
181 See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
182 See Mann & Holdych, supra note 16, at 47. Professors Mann and Holdych argue that
consumers will be worse off with mandatory warranty protection in all used car purchases.
They state that "the 'cure' is worse than the 'cold."' Id. at 48.
183 See Phillips, supra note 22, at 255-57.
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appealing to them. If buyers can fully understand what they are giving up for this
reduced price, there is no problem in enforcing disclaimers of implied warranties.
Another possible problem with a total ban on disclaimers in used car sales is
the possibility that consumers will act in bad faith and take advantage of the
ability to obtain relief for non-conformities. 184 Consumers may attempt to exploit
the use of a cause of action for warranty breach when they are simply unsatisfied
with the goods for other reasons. 185 Costly litigation may be brought by
consumers attempting to reject cars that have trivial defects, forcing courts to
make difficult determinations of what is required to render a car
"unmerchantable" for purposes of § 2-314. The solution is to give consumers
information before they enter into contracts and allow them to bargain for
whatever terms they desire. With this information, car buyers can fully utilize
their freedom of contract and rights to individual autonomy.
V. CONCLUSION
The current state of the law allows car dealers to deny consumers significant
protections that they truly need in today's marketplace. In particular, dealers can
disclaim the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular
purpose without expending any effort whatsoever. Consumers are never aware of
the protections that they could have been afforded had the contracts that they
signed contained different language. The UCC can help consumers by requiring
better informational disclosures in sales contracts where the seller attempts to
disclaim implied warranties. This could be accomplished through a change in the
language of § 2-316. The UCC (as opposed to federal or other state law) should
be changed because it is the body of law that creates the implied warranty
protection and could spark the most significant nationwide change if adopted by
state legislatures.
Both the states and the automobile dealers should be interested in this service
in order to decrease the amount of complaints and increase consumer confidence
in this industry, creating greater sales volume. Hopefully, many of these sales will
result from meaningful bargaining between car dealers and a new class of
educated consumers, who are more aware of the legal environment in which they
are purchasing.
1 84 See Gregory M. Travalio, The UCC'S Three "R 's". Rejection, Revocation and (The
Seller's) Right to Cure, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 931, 966 (1984). Professor Travalio discusses the
possibility that consumers may act in bad faith and return goods with minor defects unless the
seller is given a reasonable period of time to cure the defects and make the goods conforming.
Id.
185 Id.
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